Welcome to the autumn edition of our newsletter. As always, we aim to provide you timely and useful insights into recent legal, regulatory and industry news in a brief, accessible and interesting way. We look forward to your feedback and to any suggestions you might have on how we can improve our efforts in this regard. Happy reading!
Welcome to the Salisian | Lee LLP Newsletter
Welcome to the autumn edition of our newsletter. As always, we aim to provide you timely and useful insights into recent legal, regulatory and industry news in a brief, accessible and interesting way. We look forward to your feedback and to any suggestions you might have on how we can improve our efforts in this regard. Happy reading!
Firm News

In late September, Partner Richard Lee and Associate Yujin Chun were guests on the "Privacy Piracy" show that airs on 88.9 KUCI FM radio. The two attorneys were invited on to discuss the business impact of Pokémon GO in the context of trespass and other business owner rights vis-à-vis augmented reality gamers. It was a lengthy and informative discussion which can be linked to in full on our website's news and information page.

In August, Partner Neal Salisian and Associate Han Pai completed a 2-week jury trial and obtained a unanimous jury verdict in their favor on all the contract claims. With costs, damages, and interest, damages were in the range of $1 million.

On Thursday, June 2, 2016, Salisian | Lee LLP served as one of the sponsors for the 24th Annual West Coast Liberty Awards, hosted by Lambda Legal. The event was held at the Four Seasons Beverly Wilshire Hotel and attended by partners and associates of the firm. A great evening for a good cause was had by all.

On May 29, 2016, the firm sponsored the Asian Pacific American Women Lawyer's Alliance (APAWLA) Annual Installation Dinner, with most of the firm in attendance.
In this Issue
Cases to Watch

By H. Han Pai, Salisian | Lee LLP
CASE LAW: Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, S227393
The issue on review before the California Supreme Court is as follows: Are the time constraints in California Code of Civil Procedure section 659a jurisdictional such that a court cannot consider late-filed documents in connection with a motion for new trial?
In Kabran, the trial court entered an order granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial under Section 659 following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice. The jury found that a hospital was negligent in the care and treatment of a patient, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Plaintiff's motion papers and declarations in support of the motion were filed one day late, resulting in the clerk's cancellation of the motion. Plaintiff successfully applied ex parte for an order setting a new hearing date on the new trial motion. The hospital was ordered to file its opposition papers only 5 days after plaintiff's motion papers were filed.
On appeal, the hospital argued, among other things, that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because plaintiff's motion was untimely and it was deprived of the mandatory 10 days within which to respond to the motion under Section 659a. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order, holding that the hospital could not raise the issue of timeliness for the first time on appeal and that the court's acceptance of late evidence was within its fundamental jurisdiction.
It is well established under California law that a party's deadline to provide notice of intention to move for a new trial is jurisdictional, meaning a trial court is without power to act if the notice is late. But that same rule apparently does not apply to papers and declarations in support of the notice. Thus, the high court's clarification of this procedural discrepancy will impact California litigants' post-trial strategy and highlights the importance of adhering to such deadlines.
CASE LAW: Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC, S233096
The issue on review before the California Supreme Court is as follows: Does Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.300, which requires a trial court to exclude the expert opinion of any witness offered by a party who has unreasonably failed to comply with the rules for exchange of expert witness information, apply to a motion for summary judgment?
In Perry, the trial court granted summary judgment to a property owner in a personal injury action based on negligence and premises liability after sustaining evidentiary objections to the claimant's expert declarations under Section 2034.300.
On appeal, claimant argued, among other things, that the exclusion under Section 2034.300 applies only to testimony at trial, and cannot be used to exclude a declaration submitted on a pretrial motion for summary On appeal, claimant argued, among other things, that the exclusion under Section 2034.300 applies only to testimony at trial, and cannot be used to exclude a declaration submitted on a pretrial motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the plain language of Section 2034.300 does not limit its application to trial. Notably, the appellate court stated that use of the terms "trial date," "trial witnesses," "evidence at the trial", and other similar terms used elsewhere in the statutory scheme governing expert testimony did not convince it that the trial court's authority is limited to excluding expert opinion at trial and does not extend to pretrial proceedings.
Section 2034.300 is a powerful tool that provides litigants an avenue to exclude expert testimony of their adversaries who fail to comply with expert exchange requirements during the pretrial discovery phase. An affirmance by the Supreme Court would confirm the reach of that tool, and encourage parties to comply with those expert exchange requirements or face dire consequences.
CASE LAW: Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc., S232946
The issues on review before the California Supreme Court are as follows: (1) May a court rely on non-legislative expressions of public policy to overturn an arbitration award on illegality grounds? (2) Can a sophisticated consumer of legal services, represented by counsel, give its informed consent to an advance waiver of conflicts of interest? (3) Does a conflict of interest that undisputedly caused no damage to the client and did not affect the value or quality of an attorney's work automatically (i) require the attorney to disgorge all previously paid fees, and (ii) preclude the attorney from recovering the reasonable value of the unpaid work?
In Sheppard Mullin, the trial court confirmed an arbitration award in favor of a law firm for unpaid fees, denying the client's motion to vacate the award, in which the client argued the entire agreement was unenforceable because the firm had a conflict of interest. In particular, Sheppard Mullin was disqualified from an underlying qui tam lawsuit because it failed to obtain informed consent from two adverse clients it represented simultaneously, J-M, a defendant in the lawsuit, and South Tahoe, an intervenor in that lawsuit for which Sheppard Mullin represented in unrelated matters. Sheppard Mullin did not inform either client of the conflict.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding (1) because a challenge to the legality of a contract as a whole must be decided by the court rather than by an arbitrator, the trial court erred by deferring to the arbitrators' determination of legality; (2) an advance waiver of potential conflicts was insufficient because the firm did not inform the client when an actual conflict arose; (3) the conflict of interest rendered the fee agreement illegal and unenforceable on public policy grounds; and (4) a remand was necessary to resolve a fact issue about when the actual conflict began.
The Supreme Court's decision will have a significant impact on the beginning stages of the attorney-client relationship in California, and in particular, simultaneous representation of potentially adverse clients. Among other things, and depending on the outcome of the decision, law firms may need to re-think how they craft advance waiver provisions in their engagement agreements with their clients, and be prepared to conduct a more robust conflicts analysis, including a risks/benefits evaluation should potential conflicts arise. If affirmed, the decision would likely exemplify the limited utility of such provisions and the risky consequences for firms - by precluding recovery of fees - if a conflict arises and the provision fails to effectively cure the conflict.
Calling All Attorneys! Be Aware of the New California Rules of Professional Conduct to Be Submitted for California Supreme Court Approval by March 31, 2017

By Natalie Rastegari, Salisian | Lee LLP
The California State Bar's Second Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, chaired by Justice Lee Smalley Edmon of the California Court of Appeal, is currently leading the process of creating new and revised rules of professional conduct for practicing attorneys. The California Rules of Professional Conduct ("CRPC") govern all features of the practice of law, including how attorneys can advertise to the public, how attorneys can structure fee arrangements with clients, what types of gifts attorneys can accept, what types of information attorneys need to disclose to their clients, and how attorneys must handle conflicts of interest.

The last comprehensive changes to the CRPC took place in 1989 and 1992. Then, in October 2012, after extensive work and review by the State Bar's first commission from 2001 to 2009, the California State Bar petitioned the California Supreme Court to approve proposed revisions and additions to the CRPC. The proposed changes are sought to simplify and provide an updated set of minimum standards for attorney discipline and conduct. In particular, the State Bar undertook this project with the following four goals in mind:
  1. Facilitate compliance with and enforcement of the rules by eliminating ambiguities and uncertainties in the rules;
  2. Assure adequate protection to the public in light of developments [that] have occurred since the rules were last reviewed and amended in 1989 and 1992;
  3. Promote confidence in the legal profession and the administration of justice; and
  4. Eliminate and avoid unnecessary difference between California and other states, fostering the evolution of a national standard with respect to professional responsibility issues. (See California State Bar's Petition Request that the Supreme Court of California Approve New and Revised Rules of Professional Conduct to Replace the Existing Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 2012), pp. 3-4.)
Despite a decade-long undertaking, the California Supreme Court refrained from approving the first set of proposed rules submitted by the California State Bar since its first petition filing in 2012, and the State Bar then asked the Court to return these filings to the State Bar "for further action" in "a renewed and targeted process" that would involve a "comprehensive reconsideration" of the proposed updates. The Supreme Court also internally approved a set of recommendations intended to guide the State Bar in its task of revising the CRPC, and directed the second commission of the State Bar to complete its work and submit all proposed rules for final consideration by the Supreme Court no later than March 31, 2017. (See California Supreme Court Docket for Case No. S206125.)

A few of the noteworthy revisions to the CRPC developed by the State Bar's Second Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which total 68 proposed rules, include the following:
  • Proposed Rule 1.5.1 regulates, among other things, fee sharing by attorneys who are not in the same law firm. Referral fees are a common form of fee sharing. The proposed rule modifies the current rule to require that any agreement among attorneys to "divide a fee for legal services" must be in writing, and that the client must consent in writing to this fee division either at the time of this agreement "or as soon thereafter as reasonably practicable." The current rule does not mandate that the agreement between attorneys be in writing, and client consent can be obtained at a later time.
  • Proposed Rule 1.8.10 addresses sexual relations between attorneys and their clients. While the current rule only prohibits sexual relations in certain limited circumstances, the new proposed rule prohibits all sexual relations "unless a consensual sexual relationship existed" at the time when the attorney-client relationship commenced.
  • Proposed Rule 1.9 addresses conflicts of interest and structures the new rule consistent with the American Bar Association's Model Rules. Specifically, the proposed rule provides three straightforward provisions addressing the different duties attorneys owe to former clients, such as an attorney's duty not to represent a person whose interests are "materially adverse" to the interests of a former client in the same or a substantially related matter (unless the former client gives informed written consent). Currently, the duties to former clients can only be found hidden at the end of Rule 3-310.
  • Proposed Rule 1.10 likewise addresses conflicts of interest, but specifically the "imputation" of conflicts of interest when a new attorney is hired at a law firm. This is the first time that California would have a rule addressing this pressing issue, as it is currently only addressed in California case law. Under certain defined circumstances, a law firm can avoid the imputation of conflicts of interest with the creation of an ethical screen, and if the new attorney - screened by this ethical shield - did not substantially participate in the conflicting matter.
  • Proposed Rule 1.14 addresses a key issue for practicing trusts and estates attorneys. The newly proposed rule provides how attorneys can ethically work to protect their clients with diminished capacity, while also fulfilling their duty of confidentiality under California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). In particular, under certain circumstances, clients can consent to protective action being taken by their attorney on their behalf.
  • Proposed Rule 1.15 would require that fees paid in advance by a client be held in a client trust account, which is similar to the current rule regarding advanced costs. The proposed rule also provides specific procedures for flat fees paid in advance, which under certain circumstances would require the flat fees to be held in a firm's operating account instead of a client trust account.
  • Proposed Rule 8.4.1 amends certain prohibitions currently laid out in Rule 2-400 regarding discrimination, harassment and retaliation against clients, employees, applicants, interns, or volunteers. The proposed rule prohibits law firms and attorneys from unlawfully harassing or discriminating in representing a client, or in terminating or refusing to accept the representation of any client "on the basis of any protected characteristic or for the purpose of retaliation." The proposed rule further prohibits law firms and attorneys from unlawfully discriminating, harassing, permitting unlawful discrimination or harassment, or refusing to hire a person "on the basis of any protected characteristic or for the purpose of retaliation." For purposes of this rule, a "protected characteristic" means race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, gender, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, among others. Importantly, the proposed rule no longer requires that a tribunal of competent jurisdiction first have adjudicated a discrimination claim and found that unlawful conduct occurred, before a disciplinary investigation by the State Bar can be initiated. While this rule may already be established as law, this proposed rule will nonetheless provide additional ethical duties and create more confidence in the legal profession.
The public has had an opportunity to comment on the proposed changes to the CRPC, as the State Bar released the draft rules for public comment until September 27, 2016, and the State Bar will submit the proposed rules to the California Supreme Court by March 31, 2017. The 68 proposed rules can be found at http://calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/PublicComment/201608.aspx.

The proposed changes to the CRPC will provide the California Supreme Court an opportunity to create a more cohesive set of professional responsibility rules across the nation, and updated for recent developments in the law. Within the context of the attorney-client relationship and law firm operations, these changes would provide further protection for clients and law firm employees. Any approved amendments or additions to the CRPC will merit attention, as California attorneys and firms must be vigilant about these changes and implement them in their everyday practice, or otherwise risk disciplinary or legal action.
Assembly Bill 1722: Closing Up Shop Without a Judge

By Jay Lichter, Salisian | Lee LLP
Feuding partners of limited liability companies can finally shake hands and walk away from each other. In July 2016, California removed a long-time procedural hurdle that prevented a quick and amicable dissolution for countless limited liability companies ("LLCs") with deadlocked partners.

Assembly Bill 1722, officially signed into law on July 22, 2016, now permits a "50 percent or more" standard in place of the previous requirement that a "majority" of an LLC's voting power vote to dissolve or cancel its articles of organization. This is a small change with big consequences for LLCs with an equal number of ownership interests - particularly 2-member LLCs that are often 50-50 owners.

To put this shift in its proper context, it is important to note that a California LLC is a hybrid between a corporation and a partnership. An LLC generally has the characteristics of a partnership for operational and taxation purposes, while its members enjoy the immunity provided by a corporation to its shareholders for contract debts or tort liability. Given these protections, LLCs are commonly formed and run by single members or partners that share 50-50 ownership interest in the company.

Prior to the enactment of AB 1722, Corporations Code section 17707.01 provided that an LLC was able to dissolve and wind up its affairs, upon the happening of one of the following scenarios:
  1. An event specified in a written operating agreement or the articles of organization;
  2. By the vote of a majority of the members of the LLC, or a greater percentage of the voting interests of members as may be specified in the articles of organization, or a written operating agreement;
  3. The passage of 90 consecutive days during which the LLC has no members; or
  4. Entry of a decree of judicial dissolution.
The status quo of Section 17707.01 presented a central problem: it takes an absolute majority vote of the membership of an LLC to voluntarily elect to dissolve and wind-up business - even though the LLC may consist of no more than two people with equal ownership. In the case of a 50-50 standoff, the only way to seek dissolution would be by the members bringing a costly and time-consuming action in court for a judicial dissolution.

As the Bill's author, Assembly Member Donald Wagner, points out, AB 1722 is needed to avoid the unnecessary and costly litigation currently required to effect dissolution of two-member and other small LLCs where acrimony between members stands in the way. It also eliminates the prospect of unpleasant surprise to those seeking dissolution of a small LLC to realize that, unlike other business organizations, dissolving the LLC will require an absolute majority vote, even if the LLC consists of only two members. This problem is further underscored by the fact that many small businesses now organize without the aid of legal counsel (and employ, instead, online self-help websites like legalzoom.com), and do not realize the legal implications of forming an LLC with equal ownership. AB 1722 is thus changes the default rule to 50 percent to avoid the costly litigation that may be difficult for such small companies to afford.

The new law also harmonizes LLC rules with rules governing corporations. That is, the corporate voluntary dissolution statute (Corporations Code section 1900(a)) requires only 50 percent of the voting power of corporate shareholders to affect a dissolution under that business model.

It is important to note, however, that AB 1722 does not require a 50% voting interest in order to affect a dissolution. Rather, it merely presents a default rule that LLC members are free to change. If LLC members wish to require a higher voting percentage to initiate a dissolution, they may still do so through the LLC's articles of organization or operating agreement. The new change thus maintains flexibility for LLCs to shape their articles and operating agreements as they see fit, while avoiding the surprise default rules existing law may hold for two-member and other small LLCs.

This change to the law is a common sense shift that both empowers LLC members and unclogs courts with unnecessary and costly lawsuits. There was no officially registered opposition to AB 1722, and its enactment this past July was anything but controversial. Feuding partners are now free to shake hands and walk away from each other, without involving the judicial system.
Pokémon GO to the Courts: Legal Ramifications of Augmented Reality Gaming for Businesses

By Yujin Chun, Salisian | Lee LLP
Land ownership in its simplest form may be summarized by the ad coelom doctrine: "whoever's in the soil, it is theirs all the way to Heaven and all the way to hell," meaning property owners have a right to the space immediately above and below the ground. With technological advances such as commercial flight, however, this doctrine has undergone much refinement over the centuries. Now, with augmented reality games such as Niantic's Pokémon GO, what one truly "owns" when he or she owns land is about too be forced through much more scrutiny and fine-tuning.

Pokémon GO, which captured worldwide attention this summer, requires its players to physically move to certain locations in order to play. The game designates specific sites - including businesses - for its gameplay, having done so without having so asked for permission. While some businesses such as cafes and bars have benefited from the game encouraging its players to flock there, the game has also been unwelcome in some locations such as the Holocaust Museum and the Arlington National Cemetery. Businesses such as high-end hotels and restaurants that focus on specific crowds and certain ambiances may also experience real damage to business from having loitering gamers nearby.

The rights of businesses in this context will likely depend on who owns the virtual or augmented reality of a physical space, which the law has not had the chance to closely examine. Businesses would be hard-pressed to argue they have ownership over an augmented reality world they did not create themselves, and any effective regulation of which businesses to avoid would be impractical to implement given the vast reach and increasing varieties of such games. A blanket ban on location-based augmented and virtual reality, on the other hand, will most certainly be met with harsh criticisms of stifling innovation, which the courts consider an important factor.

For businesses searching for an answer within preexisting laws, there may be a cause of action for tortious interference. While intentional interference on the part of game developers would be difficult to prove, a cause of action in California does exist for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. It requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and a third party which contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit to plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware or should have been aware that if it did not act with due care its actions would interfere with this relationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relationship was actually interfered with. This "negligence," however, has to be actual wrongful conduct. Indeed, the California Jury Instructions require that the jury establish that the defendant - the game developer - engaged in wrongful conduct such as breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud, or violation of a statute.

Furthermore, applying negligent interference to virtual and augmented reality gaming presents several problems. Most significantly, the jury would still have to establish that the game developers knew or should have known the relationship the business had with the general public and the game’s player base, which would differ from business to business. Accurate research into each location would be overly burdensome to the game developers, if not impossible.

Games like Pokémon GO will soon force us to step into the unexplored territory of ownership of virtual reality - something that is not, by definition, real. As there is no limit on how many augmented realities can coexist in one physical space, most businesses existing in the physical world and reliant on the movement of the public will find themselves impacted one way or another as this technology develops. This calls for the courts to define ownership of not only the physical space, but also the ever-increasing layers of augmented reality atop it.
Federal Trade Secret Misappropriation: Ripe For Interpretation but Ready for Use

By Stephanie Chau, Salisian | Lee LLP
Business owners have been promised that the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) will bring enormous change to their lives, both present and future. The implications of the DTSA have been widely touted to reach a scope and impact reaching unprecedented levels, which is as much a nod to free market capitalism as it is to the legislation itself. Indeed, the DTSA, 18 U.S.C. §§1836, et seq., which was signed into law on May 11, 2016, by President Barack Obama and received large bipartisan support (410-2 in the House, 87-0 in the Senate), in an election year no less, is emblematic of a growing consensus that protecting trade secrets—and by extension, trade secret owners - is a social, economic, and political imperative in view of building, achieving, and preserving the "American Dream."

Of the four major areas of intellectual property - patents, copyright, trademarks and trade secrets - trade secrets are the last to receive full federal attention. The federalization of private civil trade secret protection offers trade secrets owners (1) more uniformity where state laws can vary, and (2) more importantly, a legal process for pursuing a federal civil cause of action and federal remedies in federal court, not to mention putative legal parity with owners of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.

Misappropriators may or may not lurk in dark corners of the dark net and may or may not be a business partner gone rogue, but they do not discriminate between the behemoth corporation and the small business owner. Now, all trade secret owners possess a powerful tool in the DTSA against misappropriators both large and small. Although trade secret misappropriation has been a federal crime since 1996, and California state law provides relief under a variant of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, trade secret owners now have direct access to federal courts, which can award injunctive relief, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorneys’ fees, and the most controversial of the lot, an ex parte order from the court to seize the trade secrets.

The remedies are the same under the DTSA and the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act - except for the ex parte seizure remedy - but litigating in federal court and state court can be wildly different. Nationwide discovery and service of process may be advantageous in certain cases, whereas state law may compel litigation in state court in others. Either way, having the option to sue in federal court will be an important strategic consideration in all misappropriation cases going forward.

But overzealous and aggressive pursuit of state trade secret misappropriation claims has traditionally come with the risk of a malicious prosecution or abuse of process claim. Indeed, in the coming months, the California Supreme Court will review the petition in Parrish v. Latham & Watkins to potentially decide whether probable cause can lie in a malicious prosecution claim where the trial court (1) found that the underlying state misappropriation claim was brought in bad faith and (2) denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the misappropriation.

The DTSA may alleviate some of that tension. As an additional avenue of relief, which is adjudicated by different standards, a DTSA claim will not always be coextensive with a state trade secret misappropriation claim. For example, the ability to pursue claims for trade secrets under the DTSA means that federal definitions of "trade secret" and "misappropriation" will govern. Although courts evaluating a malicious prosecution or abuse of process tort claim will still have to look to state law on certain issues, federal uniformity will allow courts to vet out colorable from vexatious DTSA claims against a body of authority that spans the nation, instead of just across one state.

Nonetheless, pursuit of the already contentious seizure remedy may still present an opportunity for the proliferation of malicious prosecution claims, even while also being a significant remedy for the trade secret owner. The existing controversy over the seizure remedy is inherently tethered to concerns of potential abuse. Because of the DTSA's international reach, trade secret owners who can demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" and otherwise meet the statutory requirements may be able to - in a more robust way - prevent dissemination of a trade secret, domestically and abroad, before its value can be diminished or altogether lost through its disclosure.

For instance, courts may permit trade secret owners to seize, among other things, a misappropriator's electronic or digital storage device where the trade secrets are stored. Although seizure may be especially ripe for a case where an offender is unlikely to comply with a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the seizure remedy is largely untested - in both an underlying misappropriation action and a potential malicious prosecution claim - as we await further guidance and interpretation from the courts.

Regardless, it is always important for trade secret owners to identify trade secrets and take reasonable steps and precautions to protect their secrecy. But some preemptive steps are necessary in order for a trade secret owner to benefit from several of the DTSA's protections. Most urgently, the DTSA calls to action business owners to immediately update their employment, non-disclosure and (where enforceable) non-compete agreements to provide DTSA notices regarding whistleblower immunity.

Under Section 7 of the DTSA, notice must be given "in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information" that whistleblowers - e.g., those who disclose trade secrets to government officials for the sole purpose of reporting or investigating suspected violations of the law—will not be subject to civil or criminal liability for disclosing such information. This extends equally to traditional employees as well as to consultants and contractors. Failure to provide such notice precludes a trade secret owner from recovering exemplary (punitive) damages or attorneys' fees that may otherwise be available and substantial in amount.

As the jurisprudence develops in the district and appellate courts, litigants and trade secret owners will challenge the contours and limits of the DTSA. Early cases will be instructive.

For example, Henry Schlein, Inc. v. Cook, Case No. 16-CV-03166-JST (N.D. Cal), concerns a former employee who allegedly took customer information and other trade secrets to a new and competing employer in violation of confidentiality agreements. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting the employee from accessing, using or disclosing the trade secrets to her new employer. But in view of California's prohibition on non-compete agreements, the district court declined to enter a preliminary injunction that would prevent the employee from contacting or doing business with her former customers. It is a cautionary tale in that the DTSA supplements rather than supplants state law, including but not limited to California's jurisprudence regarding the enforceability of non-compete agreements.

It is the development of ideas and their associated protection measures that will carry the small business owner and large corporation into the future. But the proprietary nature of a trade secret is exactly what makes it such a valuable asset and attractive to a miscreant. Accordingly, the federal codification of civil trade secret misappropriation signals an undoubted commitment to stemming the tide of trade secret theft and provides reinforcement in the pursuit of colorable claims by private individuals. Trade secret owners now have one more avenue for seeking redress against wrongdoers, and litigants have a new future in federal court.

Welcome to the new age of trade secret protection, folks.
Legal Disclaimer: The information contained in this newsletter is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be construed as legal advice on any subject matter. No recipients of content from this newsletter, clients or otherwise, should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any content included in the site without seeking the appropriate legal or other professional advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue from an attorney licensed in the state of California.
550 South Hope Street, Suite 750, Los Angeles, CA 90071
telephone: (213) 622-9100 | fax: (800) 622-9145 | email: info@salisianlee.com | web: www.salisianlee.com
Copyright © 2016 Salisian Lee | LLP. All rights reserved.